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 The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, on the normative level, the author 
compares three main ways of securing trust on imperfectly competitive markets – 
informal social enforcement, formal-third party enforcement, and conditional 
internal commitment to the cultural norm of trust, in terms of the standard criteria 
of allocative and adaptive efficiency.  
 Admittedly, the three ways of securing trust in reality rarely exist separately 
and as ideal types, but the author separates them for the purpose of a normative 
analysis. The task of that analysis is to show that the system of conditional (upon 
the receipt of reciprocity) internal commitment to the cultural norm of trust is, on 
the normative level, the superior way of ensuring trust in terms of allocative 
efficiency in comparison with the other two ways (social enforcement, third-party 
enforcement). In terms of adaptive efficiency, the situation is more complicated as 
cultural belief systems change relatively slowly.  
 The second purpose of the paper is to give a point of departure for the concep-
tualization of the emergence and stabilization of the system of internal commit-
ment to trust. In that context the author uses the recent empirical and theoretic 
findings of indirect evolutionary approach to rationality. 
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Introduction 
 Adam Smith in his famous description of the perfectly competitive market describes 
self-interested individuals who, despite the fact that they are solely interested in maxi-
mizing their personal gains, create general economic growth. In Smith’ description such 
market is led by an “invisible hand” that regulates the dynamics of the market. Indi-
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viduals in Smith’s market actually do not know each other and do not have any infor-
mation about each other’s economic status, past economic performance or trustworthi-
ness. However, the market provides those individuals with the full information about 
the quality, quantity and, most importantly, prices of the goods exchanged. Such market 
also does not incur any kind of transaction costs that could slow down or totally prevent 
the process of exchange. 
 For individuals on Smith’s market the notions of trust and trustworthiness are irrele-
vant because the market of purely private goods with unlimited supply and demand and 
full information about quantities and prices by definition functions with a perfect effi-
ciency without any necessity for trust. Actually, in such market individuals are neces-
sary only as rational actors who exchange goods and services, but neither can they in-
fluence the goods’ and services’ prices, nor can they affect the general dynamics of the 
market. 
 In this paper, however, I assume that the existence and enforcement of trust is a 
necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the efficient functioning of market ex-
change on imperfectly competitive markets of private goods, where many daily transac-
tions among individuals take place. A good example is a contractual relationship that 
regulates a sequential exchange of goods and services. My personal experience with an 
on-line auction site where I sent the money to the seller but have never received the 
merchandise (check Ebay.com website), is one of the examples where establishing in-
stitutions that can effectively enforce trust is important for the prevention of fraud on 
the electronic market. All those who have an extensive southern European experience in 
buying their groceries in small neighborhood shops (with a seductive smell of a fresh 
baked zucchini bread and sharp Italian cheese) and/or on farmers’ markets, know how 
merchants establish personal relationships with their permanent customers at the ex-
pense of occasional visitors of their trading establishments, which can generate a rent-
seeking behavior where permanent customers are privileged at the expense of occa-
sional customers. 
 Apart from my good and bad experiences with imperfectly competitive markets, this 
paper has been inspired by the recent developments in game theory that are devoted to 
creating a new model of rational interaction that would complement and modify the 
standard model. According to the standard model, on imperfectly competitive markets 
and in collective dilemma situations, and in the absence of effective formal enforcement 
institutions, a rational individual would free ride (receive benefits without paying costs) 
whenever s/he can. However, there have been numerous and very consistent empirical 
results [E. Ostrom, 1992; 1998; 1999a) showing that the levels of cooperation in collec-
tive dilemma situations without formal external enforcement and under certain condi-
tions (information about past actions (+), small group (+), face to face communication 
(+), cost of arriving to an agreement (-), symmetry of interests and resources (+), devel-
opment of shared norms (+) and long time horizon (+), for example, see Ostrom 1998] 
are much higher than the traditional model of rationality predicts. This has provoked a 
number of scholars (for example, Ostrom 1998; 1999a; Boswell, 1998; Cardenas, 1999) 
to try to devise a new model of rationality that would be consistent with the empirical 
findings. Trust, trustworthiness and other-regarding behavior in general play important 
roles in those models. 
 The purpose of this paper is twofold: First, on the normative level, I intend to com-
pare three main ways of securing trust on imperfectly competitive markets – informal 
social enforcement, formal-third party enforcement, and conditional internal commit-
ment to the cultural norm of trust – in terms of the standard criteria of allocative and 
adaptive efficiency. Allocative efficiency measures how efficient a market is in distrib-
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uting goods among market actors. Adaptive efficiency measures how efficient a market 
is in adapting to new trading conditions and opportunities. Admittedly, the three ways 
of securing trust in reality rarely exist separately and as ideal types, but I will separate 
them for the purpose of a normative analysis. The task of that analysis is to show that 
the system of conditional (upon the receipt of reciprocity) internal commitment to the 
cultural norm of trust is, on the normative level, the superior way of ensuring trust in 
terms of allocative efficiency in comparison with the other two ways (social enforce-
ment, third-party enforcement). In terms of adaptive efficiency, the situation is more 
complicated as cultural belief systems change relatively slowly. However, I will show 
that the individualist belief systems (Greif, 1994) are generally very efficient in adapt-
ing to new market circumstances. I will also argue that in combination with internal 
commitment, both third party and social enforcement mechanisms can achieve signifi-
cant adaptive efficiency gains. Second purpose of the paper is to give a point of depar-
ture for the conceptualization of the emergence and stabilization of the system of inter-
nal commitment to trust. In that context I will use the recent empirical and theoretic 
findings of indirect evolutionary approach to rationality. 
 The first order of business, however, is to define trust and markets as I use them in 
this paper. The definition of trust is the focus of the following section, while the defini-
tional treatment of markets is the main topic of section 3. Sections 4 and 5 tackle the 
problems of relative allocative and adaptive efficiencies of the alternate ways of trust 
enforcement. Section 6 deals with the problem of trust conceptualization as an internal 
commitment in the context of indirect evolutionary approach.  
 
Defining trust 
 The conceptualization of trust has received a considerable attention in social science 
literature (see Shapiro, 1987). Many of these definitions regard trust either as a property 
of individuals or as the emotional content, common understandings, or reciprocities of 
their interpersonal relationships (using trust more or less synonymously with the feel-
ings of faith, confidence, expectation, reliance, security, etc). Seeing trust as a personal 
quality has its moral dimension of being trustworthy. For example, I expect I can trust a 
person because I have reliable information that the person is trustworthy, which is one 
of the person’s moral qualities.  
 The definition of trustworthiness as a moral quality has its roots in moral and politi-
cal philosophy. Thus in Plato’s The Republic, for example, philosophers should be 
trusted to rule the state because they are the only ones who can understand and apply 
moral principles of justice without abusing such principles for their personal gains. In 
Kant’s moral philosophy, in order to trust each other, people need to commit themselves 
to the moral categorical imperative according to which they should behave so that the 
maxim of their will can become the universal law. If, then, rational individuals commit 
to the categorical imperative, fraud and malfeasance would be logically impossible be-
cause none of rational actors would be interested in deceitful behavior becoming a uni-
versal law, as such law would also affect those who practice deceitful behavior (they 
themselves would be deceived). On the other hand, the lack of trust among individuals 
in the Hobbesian state of nature is the main reason why such individuals decide to cre-
ate a social contract among themselves and transfer their personal rights and sovereignty 
to an authoritarian sovereign body. 
 One can also tease out another usage of trust from the literature where trust de-
scribes a kind of social organization. According to Shapiro (1987), “this conception has 
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two elements: an idea of agency in which individuals or organizations act on behalf of 
others (known as principles), and one of risky investment of future contingency inherent 
in agency relationships” (p. 625). Trust here is a social relationship where agents for 
whatever reason invest resources, authority or responsibility in another to act on their 
behalf for some uncertain future return. 
 For the purpose of this paper I will define trust as the expectation that arises within a 
community of regular, honest behavior, based on commonly shared rules and/or norms, 
on the part of other members of the community (Fukuyama, 1995: 26). In that sense 
trust can be institutionally enforced as a rule by third-party formal institutions (I can 
trust a person because I know that the person has a formal, third-party imposed incen-
tives to behave honestly). Additionally or alternatively, trust can be enforced as a norm, 
where the instruments of enforcement are informal social institutions (I can trust a per-
son to behave honestly because the person is afraid of a large cost of social exclusion 
and loss of future benefits). Here I follow the definitions of rules and norms as used in 
Institutional Analysis and Development framework as it has been developed by scholars 
at Indiana University (see Crawford and Ostrom, 1995). Trust is a rule if it is based on 
shared prescriptions (must, must not or may) that are mutually understood and enforced 
in particular situations in a predictable way by agents responsible for monitoring con-
ducts and for imposing sanctions (E. Ostrom, 1999b: 3). The Hobbsesian conception of 
solving the problem of the absence of trust in the state of nature by imposing an abso-
lute sovereign is an example of trust as a rule. Trust can be seen as a norm if it is a 
shared prescription enforced through internally and externally imposed costs and in-
ducements (E. Ostrom, 1999b: 3). Such costs and inducements, for example, can be 
connected with acquiring a good reputation for keeping promises, which is an incentive 
to perform actions with short-term costs, but long-term benefits (Kaohane, 1984; Mil-
grom/North/Weingast, 1990; Miller, 1992; Ostrom, 1998). As Fukuyama (1995) argues, 
using trust in the environment where others are trustworthy can also be an asset. Addi-
tionally, or alternatively, the establishment of trust among individuals can be a result of 
a personal commitment because some individuals have trust as an internalized system of 
beliefs that may come from their cultural tradition and/or ideology that have been part 
of their previous or present experience and training. (I can trust a person to behave hon-
estly because I know that the person has made a conditional internal commitment to 
honest behavior). In that sense, such individuals may understand and/or have reliable in-
formation that their internal commitment is relatively the most efficient way of securing 
their economic gains. A more detailed analysis of the comparative efficiency of differ-
ent ways of securing trust follows in the sections 4,5 and 6.  
 Trust as a rule and/or norm, can be conceptualized as having the characteristics of a 
public good. Public goods are goods that cannot be withheld from one individual with-
out withholding them from all (the “nonexcludability criterion”) and for which the mar-
ginal cost of an additional person consuming them, once they have been produced, is 
zero (the “nonrivalrous consumption” criterion). Thus, for example, once the trust has 
been imposed as the Hobbesian solution of an external enforcer, it is difficult for the en-
forcer to exclude those who for whatever reason disagree with the atmosphere of trust, 
without excluding everybody else. The exclusion of some for their personal gains is 
likely to produce the incentive for others to defect from the system of imposed trust, and 
thus the whole system would return to the state of nature. Moreover, once a system of 
trust is established, it is easy for new entrants to benefit from the system at little or no 
cost. 
 However, the main characteristics of public goods, non-excludability and non-rival-
rousness, can produce a “collective action problem”. According to the conventional 
wisdom about the collective action problem, individuals, in the absence of credible and 
 
Vurušić, G., Securing Trust on the Market, Politička misao, Vol. XL, (2003), No. 5, pp. 3–17 7 
                                                                                                                                              
efficient formal enforcement institutions, have strong incentive to free ride, i.e., to re-
ceive benefits provided by public goods without paying any costs. In the context of a 
contractual relationship, for example, the seller would have the incentive to benefit from 
trust as an established public good (receive money), but after receiving money and in 
the absence of effective formal enforcement mechanisms, the seller would have the in-
centive not to send the merchandise to the buyer. Thus trust as a public good on the 
market is, for example, an expectation by the buyer that s/he will receive merchandise 
after paying for it and/or that of the seller that s/he will receive compensation after 
sending the merchandise to the buyer. Such system of expectation is a public good be-
cause what an individual benefits from is compliance on the part of others, while his or 
her own compliance is typically a cost.  
 
Defining markets 
 The favorite market model of neo-classical economics is the one of perfectly 
competitive market. Many economists like to describe perfectly competitive market in 
terms of the spot retail market for fruit and vegetables. James Buchanan for example, 
has one of such descriptions: “I do not know the fruit salesman personally; and I have 
no particular interests in his well-being. He reciprocates this attitude. I do not know, and 
I have no need to know whether he is in direst poverty, extremely wealthy, or some-
where in between ... Yet the two of us are able to transact exchanges efficiently because 
both parties agree on the property right relevant to them” (1974: 17). 
 The description above points to the important characteristics that define a perfectly 
competitive market. Firstly, the perfectly competitive market is a spot market, i.e., the 
exchange takes place simultaneously. Secondly, the market is anonymous in the sense 
that market actors do not know each other personally and are not interested in each 
other's well-being. Thirdly, the goods exchanged are purely private goods. Fourthly, al-
though they do not have any information about each other, the market actors know the 
information about the prices, quantity and quality of the goods available. We can as-
sume that the seller in Bucahanan’s example exposed all the available goods and their 
prices to potential buyers, and all buyers and sellers know the prices of all the same, 
similar and different goods on the market. Fifthly, both the buyer and the seller do not 
make their decisions on whether to perform the transaction or not on the basis of the 
previous transactions with the same person (although they may have met a number of 
times in the past) nor do they base their transaction decisions on the likelihood of trans-
acting with the same person in the future (there is no “shadow of the past” nor “shadow 
of the future”). Finally, there is a huge supply and matching demand of goods and ser-
vices on the market and both buyers and sellers are relatively small and insignificant 
factors on the market in terms of determining prices of the available goods. All actors 
on the perfectly competitive market are price takers, i.e., the prices of the available 
goods depend on the market forces that are beyond buyers’ and sellers’ control, which 
also prevents price wars among suppliers. 
 Taking into account all the above characteristics of the perfectly competitive market, 
one can argue that the existence and the enforcement of trust is not a necessary condi-
tion for the effective functioning of the perfectly competitive market as transaction costs 
of enforcing the (tacit) contracts among participants are trivial or non-existent. How-
ever, the time gap between buying and selling, social relations among buyers and sell-
ers, the lack of information about fair market prices and/or high costs of obtaining one, 
monopolies, closed networks of suppliers and buyers, cultural traditions are only some 
of the factors that increase transaction costs that negatively influence the smoothness 
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and the overall efficiency of market exchange. These factors are external to the perfectly 
competitive market and are therefore called market externalities. Such externalities can 
also create opportunities for fraud, malfeasance and rent-seeking behavior. Thus it 
seems that the imperfectly competitive markets – the ones with externalities – can im-
prove their efficiency by securing trust as a rule and/or norm.  
 The following section is a comparative analysis of the main approaches to trust 
building and enforcement in social sciences and political philosophy in terms of their 
allocative and adaptive efficiency. 
 
Alternative ways of securing trust 
 (1) Informal networks of mutual compliance, based on friendship, family or kin rela-
tions, or cultural ties. 
 Compliance in these cases is secured by the threat of exclusion, and hence the loss 
of future benefits (Kandori, 1992) In the works of Ben-Porath (1987), Granovetter 
(1985), Coleman (1988; 1990) and Putnam (1993), networks of this sort are conceptu-
alized as involving relations that are (a) personal, (b) horizontal or egalitarian, (c) group 
specific, (d) informal, and (e) not explicitly directed at facilitating economic exchange – 
so that the positive impact of economic exchange can typically be taken as an unin-
tended bonus. In that context the concept of social capital gained a special prominence 
(Coleman, 1987). Social capital is a structure of social relationships that individuals can 
appropriate to assist them in their personal well-being.  
 (2) A formal set of legal rules and regulations, with third party enforcement involv-
ing special persons who have investigatory, adjudicatory and enforcement powers. 
 In this case, compliance with rules of honesty and non-malfeasance is secured by an 
external device – by arranging incentives to ensure as much as possible, that individuals 
have a self-interested reason for complying, despite the short term gains that they can 
realize by non-compliance. In this case, however, surveillance and sanctions are for-
mally organized. This is the special kind of enforcement that economists tend to pre-
suppose. As in the case of social enforcement, no special assumptions have to be made 
about what motivates people, but the impersonal nature of third-party enforcement fits 
well with the model of impersonal exchange that defines a perfectly competitive market.  
 (3) Some informal code of conduct, backed by an internal commitment to abide by 
that code. 
 On the usual way of thinking, this involves an “ideology” or cultural norm with 
which participants identify. This is the kind of enforcement that sociologists tend to pre-
suppose. However, economist North (1990) has recently argued very convincingly that 
such norms should be incorporated into economic analysis of individual behavior on the 
market. 
 As a special case of (3), one can mention (3’) relying upon the commitment to 
norms or rules, not on the basis of their content, but on the basis of whether or not they 
pass a procedural test to how they were enacted. Such an approach could be character-
ized as a commitment on the part of the participants to the rule of law. As one example, 
imagine a system in which an authoritarian leader establishes by proclamation the rules 
and laws that subsequently make for settled normative expectations on the part of par-
ticipants, and also, from time to time, announces various changes in those rules and 
laws. If the members of the community accept this leader as an ultimate authority (for 
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whatever reason), then the resulting social order may provide a matrix of trust within 
which economic transactions take place. Under the general heading of (3’), a special 
case of particular interests is (3”) where persons are internally committed to a certain set 
of rules and/or laws because they were enacted as a result of consensual process in 
which each did or could have their own preference counted. This adds to the procedural 
approach the qualification that the rule of law is in some sense a self-imposed law.  
 The important point here is that the system of personal commitment in all three 
cases here (3, 3’ and 3”) is conditional and depends on whether trusting and trustworthy 
participants in the market exchange have a reliable information on whether other par-
ticipants are also committed to trustworthiness, i.e., the trusting individuals need to 
know if the assurance problem has been solved (see E. Ostrom, 1999a). It would not be 
rational for an individual to comply with the norm of trust if at least a significant ma-
jority of others are not willing to do the same.  
 Given those alternatives, which one, or a combination thereof, turns out to be supe-
rior in terms of the standard criteria of allocative and adaptive efficacy? Recent model-
theoretic work has yielded a number of important conclusions in that respect. 
 (1) Enforcement costs: Holding the size of the group of interacting persons constant, 
the enforcement costs associated with an informal network of mutual forbearance are 
less than those with a law-based, third-party enforced, system of trust (Calvert, 1995a; 
1995b). The main idea here is that merely avoiding transactions with non-compliers is 
cheaper than having to select, train and maintain a cadre of persons specifically charged 
with enforcement responsibilities. Greif (1994), for example, in his comparative analy-
sis of the Genoese and Maghribis trading arrangements in the Mediterranean in the 
eleventh century, presents a similar argument to this effect, showing that the clan-based 
organization of Maghribis traders is relatively efficient from the perspective of en-
forcement (as well as information) costs. He also presents an argument based on wage 
theory, according to which informal enforcement also results in a more efficient way of 
resolving certain agency problems. Regardless of the group size, however, a system of 
trust based on an internal commitment to an appropriate substantive or procedural code 
is the most efficient system from the perspective of enforcement costs simply because 
internal commitment involves no enforcement costs at all. 
 (2) Information costs: For a group of any fixed size, there are real information costs 
for both the social and third-party approaches. They each require monitoring of per-
formance, even under the conditions of perfect compliance. In contrast, in a system of 
personal responsibility, information costs are minimal and essentially discretionary. As 
the size of the group increases, the information costs involved in the social enforcement 
of trust will increase at a faster rate than in the case of third-party enforcement (Calvert, 
1995a; 1995b). Thus for groups of any substantial size there are real savings to be had 
by centralizing the monitoring system, and abandoning procedure where everyone cor-
responds with everyone else (see Milgrom, North and Weingast, 1990). 
 (3) Effectiveness and limits of enforcement. Given that there are both information 
and enforcement costs associated with any system of social or third party enforcement, 
there will characteristically be a point beyond which the external surveillance and en-
forcement will not be cost effective. Moreover, leaving enforcement and information 
costs aside, the reach of both social and third party methods is limited. On the typical 
way of thinking, those devices work best in the context of repeated bilateral interaction 
and where past histories of individual performances can be kept. In the context of mul-
tilateral interactions in which persons are able to act with relative anonymity, they are 
less effective (see Hardin, 1995). In contrast, there is no issue of cost-effectiveness for a 
system of internal commitment. In principle, moreover, there does not seem to be a rea-
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son why a culturally-based belief structure might not ensure a high level of compliance 
in the mechanism of conditional personal commitment. 
 
Model-theoretic results pertaining to adaptive efficiency 
 There is a considerable evidence that clan, kin and other types of networks can be 
effectively used to improve the prospects of a group of persons in a market place (Fu-
kuyama, 1995). Examples range all the way from kin structured exchange activities of 
emigrant Chinese in Southeastern Asia, to buying cooperatives, to the informal net-
works of bureaucrats who managed to compensate for some of the inefficiencies of state 
socialism in Central and Eastern Europe. However, a wide range of model-theoretic 
findings suggests a number of cross-cutting considerations, particularly for the possibil-
ity of adaptive efficiency over the long haul. 
 (4) Opportunity costs under conditions of expanding market possibilities. Of par-
ticular importance once again is Greif’s study. He argues that the individualist cultural 
beliefs of the Genoese supported an “integrated” commercial society in which efficient 
intereconomy agency relations are pursued, while the collectivist cultural beliefs of the 
Maghribis supported “segregated” commercial society where efficient intereconomy 
agency relations are not established. That is, it was the Genoese, not Maghribis, culture 
that could efficiently respond to expanding trade opportunities. The argument here piv-
ots around the idea that the extreme individualism of the Genoese traders led them to 
depend much more heavily on various forms of third-party enforcement, and that this 
positioned them to transact more efficiently with the strangers involved in the new 
trading opportunities. 
 (5) The implications for rent-seeking. Networks may function not simply to provide 
a climate of mutually advantageous trust, but also to enable those who are so connected 
to prosper at the expense of the larger community. By such means it is possible for 
networks of individuals to manipulate prices, and, more generally, secure benefits to 
their own members at a cost to other, non-members, that is, engage in rent-seeking ac-
tivities. The allocative costs of such activity have been extensively discussed, but as the 
work of North (1990), Olson (1992) and Knight (1992) shows, the organization of per-
sons into interest groups can effectively hinder adaptation that arguably work to the 
long-range benefit of all. 
 As Max Weber (1927) observed, capitalism involves the creation of a zone of imper-
sonal interaction within which the pursuit of gain is “rationalized and rationally tem-
pered”. From Polany (1971) down to North (1990) and Portes (1993), the standard as-
sumption has been that such rational tampering requires state intervention. But that in-
volves coercive state, and all that it implies. As North succinctly puts it: Historically the 
growth of economies has occurred within the institutional framework of well-developed 
coercive policies. We do not observe political anarchy in high-income countries. On the 
other hand, the coercive power of the state has been employed throughout most of his-
tory in ways that have been inimical to economic growth (1990: 14). 
 The solution to one problem (malfeasance and fraud), then dialectically generates a 
new problem: governmental rent-seeking behavior and exploitation. North (1990: 14) is 
thus led to ask, “under what circumstances can voluntary cooperation exist without the 
Hobbesian solution of the imposition of coercive state to create cooperative solution?” 
The model-theoretic results I have been exploring here provide, I suggest, one of the 
possible answers: when participants are internally disposed to accept conditionally cer-
tain substantive or procedural constrains on their conduct. Such a cultural tradition can 
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offer a possible supplement to the external social and third-party enforcement that could 
alleviate the problems posed both by social networks and third-party enforcement meth-
ods through reducing the costs of market transactions.  
 (6) More general thoughts on conditions of adaptive efficiency.  
 The considerations raised in the subsections (4) and (5) speak about the specific 
ways in which developmental processes associated with market exchange are subject to 
path dependency in ways that constrain adaptive efficiency. Networks can facilitate ex-
change, but in ways that can close out or discourage, the development of more imper-
sonally organized market activity. The creation of third-person enforcement devices can 
lead dialectically to a whole new set of institutional problems, whose solution can again 
impact unfavorably on adaptive efficiency. However, the path-dependent nature of cer-
tain institutional developments can also work in a manner that favors adaptive effi-
ciency. 
 Greif (1994) is once again instructive in that regard. He argues that the inability of 
the Genoese to establish networks of personal trust created the conditions under which 
alternative, more impersonal and hierarchical, forms of organization took root and 
flourished. But these alternative institutional forms of organization were, he suggests, 
important for the “Rise of the West”. The central point of his analysis is that the equilib-
rium state for the Maghribis system is a horizontal structure with little differentiation in 
roles, in which merchants employ only other merchants, while in the case of Genoese, 
the equilibrium is one in which significant role differentiation takes place, i.e., vertical 
division of labor emerges where there is a distinction between merchants (as principals) 
and those who serve as their agents. This principal-agent division of labor dialectically 
generates, in turn, conditions that favor an ascending setoff of more and more complex 
institutional innovations (see also Shapiro, 1987). In particular, (a) the Maghribis em-
ploy the device of entering into contract with handshake, while the Genoese develop an 
extensive system for the registration and enforcement of contracts; (b) collective action 
against regional rulers who violate the rights of traders are enforced informally, in the 
case of Maghribis system, while the local rulers in Genoa are employed to make the 
threat of collective retaliation credible; (c) the Magribis system does not encourage the 
bills of lading, while the Genoese system does. The Genoese system leads to a whole 
series of subsequent innovations including shares available to non-family members, the 
emergence of tradable shares, stock markets and the like. Greif’s final conclusion is 
cautiously put, but is very important: “ (...) it is intriguing that the Maghribis’ societal 
organization resembles that of contemporary developing countries, whereas the Genoese 
societal organization resembles the developed West, suggesting that the individualistic 
system may have been more efficient in the long run. The analysis of this paper enables 
conjecturing about the possible long-run benefits of the individualistic system. To the 
extent that the division of labor is a necessary condition for long-run sustained eco-
nomic growth, formal enforcement institutions that support anonymous exchange fa-
cilitate economic development. Individualistic cultural beliefs foster the development of 
such institutions and hence enable society to capture these efficiency gains (...) Histori-
cally, then, the medieval Latin individualist society may have cultivated the seeds of the 
‘Rise of the West’”. 
 
Inner commitment and adaptive efficiency 
 Given Greif’s reflections on the path-dependent way in which the individualism of 
the Genoese leads to adaptively efficient institutional forms, what can one say, in a par-
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allel fashion, about the applications of the adaptive efficiency of belief-systems that 
foster conditional commitment to rule? In the case of belief systems that support an in-
ner commitment to a substantive code of conduct, there is an obvious problem. A wide-
spread inner commitment of any sort constitutes what, for example, North (1990) char-
acterizes as an informal institutional arrangement. As such, it is typically subject to a 
very gradual or incremental process of development and change. If commitment is to a 
substantive code of conduct, then, this poses a real barrier to adaptive process. Changes 
in economic conditions may mandate changes in the code. However, it is typically no 
easy matter to alter such code, or at least to alter it without undermining its authority. 
However, consider Max Weber’s observation that a key factor for the emergence of 
capitalism is the creation of a zone of personal interaction within which the pursuit of 
gain is “rationalized and rationally tempered”. This points to the possibility of a sub-
stantive code of conduct that is especially conducive to adaptive efficiency. His (con-
testable) argument regarding the role of protestant ethics also points to an aspect of the 
belief system that emerged in Western Europe that was favorable to economic transac-
tion. 
 What about belief systems that support an inner commitment to a procedural norm? 
While such a commitment constitutes an informal institution, and thus is itself typically 
subject to incremental changes, it allows for more rapid alteration or adaptation than 
substantive codes. This does not ensure, however, that the procedural process of revi-
sion will result in market enhancing changes or even, for that matter, any sort of mutu-
ally beneficial exchange. Procedural alterations may, in a rent seeking fashion, serve 
some at the expense of others. This is especially a danger insofar as the procedural norm 
is framed in terms of the pronouncements of an autocratic ruler, since in that case there 
is no check on the ruler arranging things to his own, rather than to the subjects’ advan-
tage.  
 Does a commitment to the rule of law offer any advantages from the perspective of 
adaptive efficiency? That changes must pass the test of being accepted by a democratic 
majority, or even a super-majority, is once again hardly any guarantee that the changes 
made will be market enhancing. The whole of the public choice literature reminds us of 
how democratic majorities can work, not only against the public good, but also even 
against their best (especially long-term) interests. Policies that are crazy from an eco-
nomic perspective can even satisfy constitutionally mandated requirements for a super-
majority (as the ill-fated alcohol prohibition mandate in the United States made clear). 
Interestingly enough, it would seem that it is not purely democratic, but rather constitu-
tional constraints on the exercise of power, governmental or public, that is crucial for 
creating conditions for economic growth. As North (1990) argues, what is needed is a 
complex system of checks and balances (which by definition have no place in either a 
system of autocracy or pure democracy). A parallel and important point can be found in 
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) who argue for a mixed substantive/procedural approach 
where certain substantive principles (the “Bill of Rights”) are given constitutional 
status, and thus bind the decisions of executives, legislatures and courts alike.  
 
Conceptualizing the emergence and stabilization of internal 
motivation 
 The findings summarized in sections 3,4 and 5 suggest that there are substantial ad-
vantages to be obtained in so far as individuals can make a mutual inner commitment to 
choose subject to the constraints of rules. It is important to see, however, that there are 
gains of this sort to be secured even if this approach is coupled with both social and/or 
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formal enforcement devices. That is, there are gains to be secured even in cases if such 
an inner commitment governs only some activities and even if only governs the choices 
of some rather than all participants. 
 In this section I would like to address the problem of how to model the emergence 
and stabilization of the inner commitment. This is especially a problem when the appeal 
is to neo-classical economic models, since they assume that persons act so to realize 
economic gain, wealth and the like, and it is not clear how from that perspective to treat 
any sort of internal commitment to rules. Standard game theory models do not present 
such a problem, since while they do presuppose that individuals seek to maximize ex-
pected utilities or values, they presuppose nothing about what it is that people value. 
Thus it is open for us, as North (1990; 1994) suggests, to explore the implications of as-
suming that people value more than just monetary rewards (see for example, Margolis, 
1985; Sugden, 1986; Sen, 1977; North, 1990; Bowles, 1998; E.Ostrom, 1998, 1999a; 
Cardenas, 1999). Suppose, however, that persons do have a strong inner commitment to 
abide by rules, so that mutual compliance turns out to be equilibrium state. Still, this as-
sumption is only ad hoc and is not very convincing without any additional supporting 
arguments. 
 A more promising move is to appeal to some sort of cultural or genetic evolutionary 
models, which can address the question of how such “inner dispositions” might have 
evolved (see, for example, Frank, 1987; Pinker, 1994; Skyrms, 1996). The recent devel-
opments in evolutionary theory show that the survival of groups in early human history 
did not only depend on the aggressive search for individual returns, but also on the abil-
ity to effectively solve daily collective action problems. The groups who managed to 
solve such problems most effectively were most likely to survive. In that context, recog-
nizing who is a trustworthy reciprocator and who is a plain cheater was of the essential 
importance (Alexander, 1987; Hirshleifer, 1997; Boyd/Richardson, 1985; Barkow/Cos-
mides/Toby, 1992; as reported in Ostrom, 1999a: 14) However, as Elinor Ostrom 
(1999a) rightly argues,” A strict evolutionary approach is difficult to apply when trying 
to understand how individuals with a propensity to learn social norms, interact, adapt, 
and learn within shorter time frames. An evolutionary game-theoretical model of a col-
lective action situation would, for example, treat all individuals as having inherited a 
particular type of strategy and unable to change their own strategy (p.16). 
 For that reason Ostrom argues for the application of an indirect evolutionary ap-
proach where players receive objective payoffs, but make decisions based on the trans-
formation of those payoffs into intrinsic preferences. This means that players in social 
dilemma situations (and imperfectly competitive markets) take the material payoffs as 
inputs in their personal internal games where other inputs are variables that range from 
information about other players, values and norms, memory about the past interactions 
with the same or similar players, to possibly age and occupation.  
 Particularly interesting for my analysis here is Ostrom’s report (1999a) on the results 
of the trust game played by two different types of individuals: trustworthy player and 
rational egoist. Here we can assume that the trustworthy type is chosen by nature and/or 
influenced by his or her cultural tradition, previous experience and training to make a 
conditional internal commitment to rules. Trust game is a sequential prisoners’ dilemma 
game where individuals, for example, do not exchange goods on the spot market, but 
there is a time gap between the buyer sending seller money for a private good, and seller 
sending the merchandise to the buyer. Many contractual relationships, regardless of 
whether they try to regulate provision of private/ and or public goods, have the same 
structure.  
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 Ostrom (1999a) reports that, according to numerous and consistent experimental re-
sults, the survival of the trustworthy player and the rational egoist primarily depends on 
the availability of information to each player about the other players’ type (rational 
egoists or trustworthy person). The conducted experiments show that with complete in-
formation regarding types trustworthy type will receive more opportunities to perform 
and receive higher payoffs, while rational egoists will consistently receive lower payoff. 
In the environment of low information regarding types, the population of trustworthy 
types is bound to decline. On the other hand, if there is a noisy signal (Frank, 1987), 
about a player’s type that is at least more accurate than random, the trustworthy type 
will survive as a substantial proportion of the population. Viewed as a cultural evolu-
tionary process, new entrants to the population would be more likely to adopt the pref-
erence ordering of those who obtained the higher material payoffs in the immediate 
past. Viewed as a learning process, those who were less successful would tend to learn 
the values of those who have achieved higher material payoffs (Ostrom, 1999a: 18-19). 
It is important to note here that trustworthy types are ready to begin the interaction in a 
cooperative manner and are ready to reciprocate the other players’ behavior (as their 
internal commitment to trust is conditional upon the trustworthy behavior of other play-
ers). 
 If according to the indirect evolutionary approach objective payoffs constitute only 
one of the inputs in the internal game that has preferences as its solutions, what other 
inputs do individuals bring into the game? Building on the works of Ostrom (1992, 
1998, 1999a), McCabe and Smith (1998) and Bowsel (1998), Cardenas (1999) proposes 
a multilayer framework where individuals in various situations do not make their deci-
sions exclusively on the basis of the expected payoffs, but take into account a number of 
other complex factors. According to Cardenas, people create their preferences on the 
basis of a complex, four layer framework: of (1) static game layer (net payoffs from 
each game), (2) dynamic game layer (experience, reciprocity, reputation), (3) prefer-
ences layer (values, wealth, occupation, trust, and (4) context group layer (shared 
norms, social distance, heterogeneity , group identity, etc). Cardenas also makes an im-
portant point that, according to his framework, individuals on the perfectly competitive 
market need to switch on only the first layer because the transaction costs of enforcing a 
contract on such market are trivial or non-existent. In the situations of imperfectly com-
petitive markets (private and public goods included) individuals need to switch on the 
other layers, including the preference layer containing trust, in order to reduce transac-
tion costs of their market transactions.  
 The empirical and theoretical findings of evolutionary theory and indirect evolution-
ary approach lead to at least the following important conclusions. First, it is possible to 
argue that human disposition to trustworthy behavior on imperfectly competitive market 
can be perceived as not totally and necessarily dependent on external payoffs, but is part 
of human nature and has been developed through the evolutionary process of learning 
where culture, family and past experience play important roles.  
 Second, the evolutionary models and empirical results based on them provide us 
with a point of departure for empirical thinking about the comparative allocative effi-
ciency of the market with committed trustworthy types. In the cases of high availability 
of reliable information about the player’s types, trustworthy behavior reaps higher pay-
offs than rationally egoistic behavior. The experimental results show (Ostrom, 1999a) 
that rational egoists are more likely to earn higher payoffs than trustworthy players in 
the high enforcement regimes, regardless of the availability of the information regarding 
players’ types. Thus it is a matter of empirical research to lead us to answer the question 
under what conditions the enforcement costs necessary for the relative efficiency of the 
rational egoist markets are lower than the information costs necessary for the relative ef-
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ficiency of the markets based on the trustworthy behavior and vice versa. A possible ex-
ample are some international markets where both information and enforcement costs are 
high, but, especially in the view of the available communication technology, informa-
tion costs seem to be lower than enforcement costs.  
 Third, the process of learning the norm of trustworthiness has the dimension of cul-
tural evolution where new entrants to particular interacting groups learn and accept the 
norms of those players who receive higher payoffs. Forth, according to the model pro-
posed by the indirect evolutionary approach, trustworthy persons are typically not slav-
ishly committed to the rules and norms of trustworthiness. This takes us back to what I 
suggested above was one of the defining characteristics of inner commitment, that it is 
conditional commitment. If it is rational to be willing to accept constraints on one’s 
maximizing behavior provided that others do the same, and we have reliable informa-
tion about the others’ behavior, then it is also not rational to accept such constraints 
when others are not willing to reciprocate or when we do not have reliable information 
about their possible behavior. What this means is that while within the model of per-
sonal commitment rational agents do not face the public goods problem (being rational 
does not mean “free riding” on the efforts of others) still these agents face an “assurance 
problem” that could be solved by low-cost information mechanisms that provide infor-
mation about the types of the players (see Milgrom/North/Weingast, 1990; Ostrom, 
1999a). 
 
Need for a mixed approach 
 Given that, on a normative level, a case can be made, from the perspective of effi-
ciency, for an internal commitment to compliance, as distinct from externally imposed 
commitment, would it be possible for a society to cease to rely altogether on such less 
efficient forms? It would seem not. Theoretical models that analyze human interactions 
tend to assume that individuals are more or less perfectly rational, i.e., that they will 
most likely try to maximize their utilities even in the cases where those utilities are de-
fined as the feelings of satisfaction for behaving in an other-regarding manner. But in 
the real world, as numerous experimental results show, the compliance problem cannot 
be effectively addressed unless one has a way to deal with imperfectly rational persons 
as well. Even if one has a model of rationality that makes the case for internal commit-
ment, one can expect that there will be persons who will not be moved by whatever ar-
guments might be mounted from that perspective, but who may nonetheless be moved 
by the more traditional approach involving direct, external incentives (in the form of so-
cial and/or formal, third-party sanctions). The findings presented in this paper, however, 
point out to the importance of teaching and learning social norms of trust and reciproc-
ity for efficient market exchange on imperfectly competitive markets (and collective 
dilemma situations), which can, in turn, help us “live longer and prosper”. 
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